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RISING TEMPERATURES, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, AND
PUBLIC NUISANCES: THE SECOND CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON
THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE IN CONNECTICUT
V AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States House of Representatives' passage of the
Waxman-Markey Act, which sought to limit the nation's overall
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through a cap-and-trade system,
led many environmentalists to hope the federal government would
finally address the threat posed by climate change.' Those hopes
were shattered less than a year later when Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid stopped pursuing the cap-and-trade legislation upon re-
alizing he could not muster the filibuster-proof majority needed for
passage. 2 Due to Congress's failure to substantively address global
warming and the bleak prospects of any comprehensive legislation,
concerned citizens have begun searching for alternate routes to re-
duce the nation's GHG emissions.3 Recently, some states and envi-
ronmental groups have initiated litigation against large GHG
1. SeeJohn M. Broder, House Backs Bill, 219-212, to Curb Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2009, at Al (documenting House's passage of Waxman-Markey
Act). The objective of the bill was to reduce greenhouse gases in the United States
by 17 % from their 2005 levels by the year 2020, and 83 % by the year 2050. Id.
While some environmentalists had problems with the bill's concessions to the coal
industry and other special interests, prominent environmental groups, including
the Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund, and World Wildlife Fund, sup-
ported it. The Cap-and-Trade Bill: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, ECONoMIsT, Sept.
12, 2009, at 83, available at http://www.economist.com/node/1 44 19395 (noting
compromises that environmentalists were willing to make). In response to the
House's passage of Waxman-Markey, the American Petroleum Institute (an oil in-
dustry trade group) funded a campaign by an organization called Energy Citizens.
Id. This organization sponsored rallies to protest the climate change bill in a
handful of American cities. Id.
2. See America's Climate Policy: Capped, EcONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 50, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/166932 93 (explaining Senator Reid's deci-
sion to remove GHG cap-and-trade bill from Senate agenda due to insufficient
support from members). "With the mid-term elections sure to swing heavily away
from Mr. Reid's Democrats, there is now no possibility of comprehensive climate-
change legislation in America for years." Id.
3. See Climate-Change Policy: Let it Be, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 69, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/16693691 (observing that after cap-and-trade
legislation died in Senate, groups desiring to reduce emissions have identified al-
ternate strategies). In lieu of federal legislation, some of the methods environ-
mental groups plan on using to reduce GHG emissions include lobbying the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean
Air Act and encouraging individual states to implement their own cap-and-trade
schemes. Id.
(321)
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emitters under the tort theory of public nuisance.4 Given the
widely perceived lack of meaningful political action regarding
global warming, such litigation may be one of the best available
tools for addressing climate change for the foreseeable future.5
Nevertheless, climate change litigation is very controversial.6
Considering the partisan debate surrounding the issue and the
problem's truly global scope, it should come as no surprise that the
political question doctrine has emerged as an obstacle for climate
change litigants. 7 All four global warming cases filed to date against
industry defendants-car manufacturers, oil and gas producers,
and electrical utilities-were initially dismissed as nonjusticiable po-
litical questions.8
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (American Electric) ,9
the Second Circuit rejected the application of the political question
doctrine, opening a path for climate change actions to be adjudi-
cated on their merits.10 In American Electric, eight states, New York
City, and three land trusts sued six of the nation's largest electric
power companies that operated fossil fuel-fired plants in twenty dif-
ferent states." The plaintiffs sought an abatement of the compa-
nies' alleged ongoing contributions to the public nuisance of global
4. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 266-68
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (asserting public nuisance claim against power plant emissions);
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 M1J, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (filing claim against automakers for contributing to public
nuisance of global warming); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (pursuing tort-based climate change
litigation).
5. See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-so-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Cli-
mate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 1, 6 (2003) (explaining how public
nuisance actions could provide viable method for reducing GHG emissions in cur-
rent political environment where climate change legislation is unlikely in foresee-
able future).
6. See Amelia Thorpe, Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation and the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine, 24 J. LAND USE & ENv-rL. L. 79, 85 (2008) (observing controversy
surrounding tort-based climate change litigation).
7. See Maria V. Gillen, The Rebirth of the Political Question Doctrine, 23 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 23, 23 (2008) (discussing how political question doctrine has
obstructed climate change litigation).
8. See id. (noting that climate change lawsuits based on public nuisance were
dismissed by district courts as presenting nonjusticiable political questions).
9. 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
10. See Tom Mounteer, Returning the Common Law to its Rightful Place, 40
ENvrL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYsis 10361, 10361 (2010) (commenting that American
Electric reopened possibility of utilizing public nuisance actions to address climate
change).
11. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 316-17 (2d Cir.
2009) (discussing facts and procedural posture of case).
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warming. 12 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the claim as a nonjusticiable political question, but
the Second Circuit reversed on appeal.' 3 After an extensive analy-
sis, the court held that the plaintiffs' action did not implicate the
political question doctrine and permitted the case to proceed to
the merits stage.' 4
This Note will analyze the Second Circuit's treatment of the
political question doctrine in American Electric, along with the deci-
sion's implications for future climate change litigation.' 5 Part II of
this Note provides the case's factual background, the parties' pri-
mary arguments regarding the political question issue, and the
court's holding.' 6 In Part III, this Note explains the legal back-
ground of the Second Circuit's resolution of this issue by discussing
the political question doctrine test and how courts have applied it
in various factual contexts.' 7 Part IV outlines the reasoning the Sec-
ond Circuit utilized to arrive at its holding on the political question
issue.18 Part V critically examines the court's analysis and conclu-
sions.' 9 Finally, Part VI discusses the potential impact of American
Electric on the ability of future climate change litigants to overcome
the justiciability barrier that has previously derailed such lawsuits. 20
II. FACTS
The Second Circuit's decision in American Electric arose out of a
lawsuit filed in July 2004 by eight states-California, Connecticut,
Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wiscon-
sin-the city of New York, and three private land trusts against six
utility and service companies in the electric power industry.21 The
12. See id. at 318 (explaining relief sought by plaintiffs).
13. See id. at 315 (holding that political question doctrine does not apply to
plaintiffs' claims and vacating judgment of district court).
14. See id. at 314-15 (providing brief overview of case's factual background
and major issues).
15. For a description of the Second Circuit's application of the political ques-
tion doctrine, see infra notes 110-53 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the facts of American Electric, see infra notes 21-
39 and accompanying text.
17. For an explanation of the applicable legal background surrounding Ameri-
can Electric, see infra notes 40-109 and accompanying text.
18. For a narrative analysis of the Second Circuit's decision, see infra notes
110-53 and accompanying text.
19. For a critical analysis of the court's holding in American Electric on the
political question issue, see infra notes 154-208 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the potential impact of American Electric, see
infra notes 20948 and accompanying text.
21. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009)
(providing description of litigants). The six defendants named in the complaint
2011] 323
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complaint sought to abate the "defendants' ongoing contribution
to a public nuisance," stemming from their "substantial con-
tribut[ion] to elevated levels of carbon dioxide and global
warming."22
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants' contributions to
the atmospheric carbon level were quite significant. 23 The defend-
ants' annual emissions comprised approximately one quarter of the
U.S. electric power sector's carbon dioxide emissions and about ten
percent of all carbon dioxide emissions from human activities na-
tionwide.24 Furthermore, the plaintiffs' complaint cited reports
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences as evidence of the strong scientific
consensus that heightened GHG concentrations cause global
warming.25
While the climate change threat may be global in scope, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleged climate change was imposing acutely
local, harmful effects on their states' environments, residents, and
property.26 According to the states, climate change was reducing
California's mountain snowpack, "the single largest freshwater
source, critical to sustaining water to the State's 34 million residents
during the half of each year when there is minimal precipitation."2 7
The states also alleged they were experiencing other harmful ef-
included: American Electric Power Company, Inc.; American Electric Power Ser-
vice Corporation; Southern Company; Tennessee Valley Authority; Xcel Energy;
and Cinergy Corporation. Id. Five of the defendants directly generated GHG
emissions as utility companies, whereas American Electric Power Service Corpora-
tion merely provided management and professional services on behalf of Ameri-
can Electric Power Company. Id. at 316 n.1.
22. Id. at 316 (describing allegations made in states' complaint).
23. See id. (noting plaintiffs' allegations as to magnitude of defendants' an-
nual GHG emissions).
24. Id. (outlining plaintiffs' claims regarding defendants' contribution to at-
mospheric GHG levels and global warming). The plaintiffs claimed the defend-
ants' GHG emission levels were particularly unacceptable given how the
companies have "practical, feasible and economically viable options for reducing
emissions." Id. at 317. Furthermore, according to the plaintiffs, the implementa-
tion of such GHG-reducing alternatives by the defendants would not require a
material rise in consumers' electricity costs. See id.
25. See id. at 316-17 (noting plaintiffs' evidence that elevated GHG emissions
cause global warming). The plaintiffs also stated that a proportional relationship
exists between GHG emissions and the harm posed by global warming: "The
greater the emissions, the greater and faster the temperature change will be, with
greater resulting injuries." Id. Conversely, the "lower the level of emissions, the
smaller and slower total temperature change will be, with lesser injuries." Id.
26. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 317 (noting harmful effects of climate change
that states alleged were both already occurring and likely to occur or accelerate in
future).
27. Id. (discussing details alleged in plaintiffs' complaint).
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fects of climate change, including warmer average temperatures;
later freezes and earlier spring thaws; and a decrease in average
snowfall and the duration of snow cover in New England and Cali-
fornia.28 The plaintiffs predicted that if carbon emissions are not
reduced to a sustainable level, a catalogue of injuries would befall
upon them within ten to one hundred years.29 The impact of these
injuries on property, ecology, and public health, according to the
plaintiffs, would cause them extensive economic harm.30
The plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York.31 Specifically, they re-
quested that the court permanently enjoin each defendant to abate
the public nuisance of excessive emissions, first by capping their
emissions, and second by ordering an emissions reduction of a
specified percentage each year for at least ten years.32 The defend-
ants, however, contended that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted because, inter alia: (1) there is
no recognized federal common law cause of action to reduce GHG
emissions; (2) separation of powers principles, specifically the polit-
ical question doctrine, precluded the court from adjudicating these
actions; and (3) congressional legislation has displaced any federal
common law cause of action addressing global warming.33
The district court refused to allow the case to proceed to the
merits stage, dismissing it as a nonjusticiable political question.34
28. See id. (discussing states' allegations of harm they suffered from climate
change).
29. See id. at 318 (detailing future injuries state litigants claim they will incur if
global warming is not mitigated through reduction in GHG emissions). Specifi-
cally, the states claimed they would suffer the following future injuries:
[I]ncreased illnesses and deaths caused by intensified and prolonged
heat waves; increased smog, with a concomitant increase in residents' re-
spiratory problems; significant beach erosion; accelerated sea level rise
and the subsequent inundation of coastal land and damage to coastal
infrastructure; salinization of marshes and water supplies; lowered Great
Lakes water levels, and impaired shipping, recreational use, and hydro-
power generation; more droughts and floods, resulting in property dam-
age; increased wildfires, particularly in California; and the widespread
disruption of ecosystems, which would seriously harm hardwood forests
and reduce biodiversity.
Id.
30. Id. (describing economic injuries states allege they will incur upon mani-
festation of predicted future harms).
31. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 317 (noting venue where American Electric plaintiffs
filed suit).
32. Id. (explaining equitable relief sought by plaintiffs).
33. Id. at 319 (illustrating grounds defendants asserted during motion to dis-
miss plaintiffs' complaint before district court).
34. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (dismissing case as nonjusticiable under political question doctrine).
2011]1 325
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The court reasoned that the political question doctrine applied be-
cause resolution of the plaintiffs' "transcendently legislative" lawsuit
required initial policy determinations that must first be made by the
elected branches.35 According to the district court, the required
initial policy determinations included the "identification and bal-
ancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national se-
curity interests."3 6 Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that their lawsuit presented a "simple nuisance claim of
the kind courts have adjudicated in the past."37 Rather, the district
court agreed with the defendants that "none of the pollution-as-
public-nuisance cases cited by [p]laintiffs has touched on so many
areas of national and international policy."38 On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dis-
missing the complaint on political question grounds.39
III. BACKGROUND
The political question doctrine is a justiciability doctrine ar-
ticulated by the U.S. Supreme Court which operates essentially as a
function of the separation of powers principle. 40 When the politi-
cal question doctrine applies, a court is prevented from adjudicat-
ing the case.41 The genesis of the doctrine can be traced back to
the celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison,42 where Chief Justice
35. See id. at 272 (commenting on what court perceived to be legislative na-
ture of plaintiffs' lawsuit and requested relief).
36. Id. at 274 (observing initial policy decisions court would have to make if it
decided plaintiffs' case on its merits).
37. Id. at 272 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that their case was ordinary nui-
sance action).
38. Id. (distinguishing plaintiffs' lawsuit from previous environmental public
nuisance cases). The plaintiffs cited Missouri v. Illinois, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee as evidence that courts had previously handled
important and wide-reaching pollution cases under this tort doctrine. See id.
39. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009)
(summarizing Second Circuit's holding on political question issue). The court
also ruled in the plaintiffs' favor on a number of collateral issues, clearing the way
for a federal court to decide the plaintiffs' action on the merits on remand. See id.
Specifically, the court also held that all of the plaintiffs had standing to sue; the
federal common law of nuisance governed their claims; the plaintiffs had success-
fully stated claims under the federal common law of nuisance; and their claims
under federal common law were not displaced by Congressional or EPA action. Id.
40. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (noting relationship between
judiciary and coordinate branches of government provides rationale for political
question doctrine).
41. See Shawn M. LaTourette, Note, Global Climate Change: A Political Question,
40 RUTGERs L.J. 219, 225 (2008) (summarizing political question doctrine and its
effect on court's ability to adjudicate case).
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (discussing nature of political
question).
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Marshall remarked, "where the heads of departments are the politi-
cal or confidential agents of the executive,. . . act[ing] in cases in
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,. . .
their acts are only politically examinable." 43
Despite its historical pedigree, the doctrine is quite controver-
sial and has been severely criticized by scholars who favor robust
judicial review.4 4 These scholars view a doctrine that excludes con-
stitutional issues from the judiciary's reach with "strict and skeptical
scrutiny." 45 The political question doctrine contains two strands:
one is constitutionally-based, arising from the text and structure of
the document,46 while the other is prudential and not constitution-
ally required.47
The Supreme Court delivered its most comprehensive, and
often cited, articulation of the political question doctrine in Baker v.
Carr (Baker).48 The Court identified six factors in Baker, any one of
which, if deemed "inextricable from the case at bar," indicate the
presence of a political question:
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
43. Id. (explaining that issues or actions constitutionally committed to politi-
cal branches are not judicially reviewable).
44. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 133
(3d ed. 2006) (relating how some critics of political question doctrine contend
"that it is inappropriate to leave constitutional questions to the political branches
of government" because "the judicial role is to enforce the Constitution").
45. See Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597,
600 (1976) (observing that because judicial review is now "firmly established as a
keystone of our constitutional jurisprudence," any doctrine that exempts cases
from judicial review should be viewed critically).
46. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Ques-
tion Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 247-48
(2002) (describing constitutionally-based strand of political question doctrine).
This strand states that the "Constitution carves out certain categories of issues that
will be resolved as a matter of total legislative or executive discretion." Id. at 247.
47. See id. at 253 (explaining how prudential strand of political question doc-
trine is not anchored in constitutional interpretation, but rather was created by
courts to protect their legitimacy and avoid conflict with political branches).
48. 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (discussing need and Court's intention to
clarify political question doctrine).
3272011]
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ence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.49
These six elements are "probably listed in descending order of both
importance and certainty"50 and contain both the constitutionally
mandated and prudential strands of the political question
doctrine.51
The first Baker factor represents the "classical" or constitution-
ally anchored strand, while the last five factors comprise the pru-
dential strand of the doctrine.52 The Baker test and its role in the
political question doctrine analysis can best be understood by exam-
ining the specific areas where the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have either invoked or refused to invoke the doctrine.53 Ac-
cordingly, the next section will briefly review how federal courts
have applied the Baker factors in the following two contexts where
the political question doctrine has most commonly been utilized:
domestic constitutional issues and disputes implicating foreign pol-
icy issues.
A. Domestic Constitutional Issues
Certain recurring domestic political issues have frequently
raised political questions.54 The Supreme Court has consistently
held that controversies arising over the interpretation of the Guar-
antee Clause, which states that the U.S. guarantees those living in
each state a republican form of government, are nonjusticiable.55
In Luther v. Borden,56 for example, the Court held that the text of
49. Id. at 217 (providing six-factor test for political question doctrine).
50. See Vieth v. jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (indicating order in which
Baker criteria should be considered).
51. See Barkow, supra note 46, at 265 (observing that Court in Baker recog-
nized not only classical theory of political question doctrine, but prudential strand
as well).
52. See id. (identifying which Baker factors comprise constitutional and pru-
dential strands of political question doctrine and noting uncertainty regarding sec-
ond factor's classification).
53. See CHEMERINSKv, supra note 44, at 131 (explaining that to understand how
courts are likely to apply political question doctrine, it is necessary to review scena-
rios where political questions have been found).
54. For a discussion of the domestic issues that tend to raise political ques-
tions, see infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
55. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 134 (explaining how Court "consist-
ently has held" that cases alleging Guarantee Clause violations are nonjusticiable).
56. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 35-36 (1849) (establishing Guarantee Clause prece-
dent). This seminal Guarantee Clause case involved a trespass claim against a sher-
iff who claimed he acted under the lawful authority of the Rhode Island
government. See id. at 34-39. The trespass occurred during a period of political
8
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the Constitution's Guarantee Clause commits to Congress the de-
termination of what government a state establishes.57 The Supreme
Court has also held that certain congressional decisions concerning
the Legislative Branch's processes and members are not judicially
reviewable because their interpretation is constitutionally commit-
ted to that branch.5 8 This deferential approach was demonstrated
in Field v. Clark,5 9 where the Court dismissed as nonjusticiable a
claim that a tariff law was invalid because a section of the statute
passed by Congress was omitted from the final version signed by the
President.60
Federal courts have often found issues concerning the ratifica-
tion of constitutional amendments to present nonjusticiable politi-
cal questions.61 For example, the Supreme Court held in Coleman
turmoil in the state, where two factions claimed to constitute its rightful govern-
ment. See id. at 34. The Supreme Court refused to decide on its merits the issue of
which faction constituted the legal government of Rhode Island at the time of the
trespass. See id.
57. See id. at 42 (explaining that issue of which group was rightful government
of Rhode Island was constitutionally committed to Congress). The Court ex-
plained that the Guarantee Clause commits this decision to Congress because, in
order for "the United States to guarantee each State a republican government,
Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State
before it can determine whether it is republican or not." Id.
58. See CHEMERINSKY, supia note 44, at 143 (noting that Court often finds con-
gressional self-governance nonjusticiable).
59. 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892) (finding tariff law's validity nonjusticiable).
60. See id. at 673-75 (explaining why process by which House and Senate pass
and certify bills is not justiciable). The Supreme Court, basing its decision largely
on what would later become the first Baker factor, held that the Constitution com-
mitted the issue to the political branches. See id. at 670-71. The Court has been
unwilling to cede to Congress all constitutional oversight of its decisions pertaining
to processes and members, however, particularly when congressional action ex-
ceeds the scope of a textual commitment. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 494-505 (1969) (deciding case based on House's passage of resolution to pre-
vent member elected to Ninetieth Congress from taking his seat). In Powell, the
plaintiff alleged that the House's resolution, excluding him from taking his seat as
Congressman, violated the Constitution. Id. He argued that Article I, Section Five
of the Constitution allows those in Congress, when acting as "the Judge of the
Qualifications of its own Members," to base their judgment on only the qualifica-
tions explicitly stated in the text. See id. at 521-24. The Court agreed and held that
no political question was present because Congress's decision to exclude the plain-
tiff was based on factors beyond those explicitly required in the text. See id. at 548.
The Court explained that Article I, Section Five is "at most a 'textually demonstra-
ble commitment' to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in
the Constitution." Id. Therefore, the political question doctrine did not bar the
Court from adjudicating the plaintiffs claim. Id.
61. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 145-46 (observing that, while Supreme
Court has invoked political question doctrine in disputes over ratification proce-
dures, it has done so inconsistently).
2011] 329
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v. Miller6 2 that the Constitution consigned to Congress the exclusive
authority to determine the efficacy of ratifications by state legisla-
tures, in light of previous rejection or withdrawal.63 The Court has
also suggested that particular aspects of the impeachment process
textually committed to Congress are not judicially reviewable. 64 In
Nixon v. United States,65 the Court held that the Constitution's asser-
tion "[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all impeach-
ments," made the Senate responsible for interpreting the meaning
of the word "try."66 Finally, a plurality of the Court in Vieth v. Jube-
lirer67 recently held that political gerrymandering claims are nonjus-
ticiable because "no judicially discernible and manageable
standards. . . have emerged" for adjudicating them.68
B. Foreign Policy
The political question doctrine is raised more often in the for-
eign affairs context than in any other area.69 Cases that directly
implicate foreign affairs issues are sometimes deemed nonjusticia-
ble because their resolution "frequently turn [s] on standards that
defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion de-
62. 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939) (finding Constitution committed power to Con-
gress to determine effectiveness of state legislature's ratification of constitutional
amendments).
63. See id. at 446-51 (noting that historical precedent of Fourteenth Amend-
ment's passage-where Congress decided certain states had ratified amendment de-
spite previous rejection or attempted withdrawal-supports Court's finding that this
matter was political question). The Court also determined that only Congress had
the authority to decide the duration of the "reasonable time" by which an amend-
ment must be ratified because no standard or criteria existed with which a court
could reach an appropriate decision. See id. at 453-55.
64. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 148-49 (discussing how Court first rec-
ognized impeachment as implicating political question doctrine).
65. 506 U.S. 224, 225 (1993) (finding plaintiffs claim that Senate impeach-
ment procedures violated Impeachment Trial Clause nonjusticiable).
66. See id. (observing that Impeachment Trial Clause met Bakers textual com-
mitment factor because Clause's language and structure reflect "a grant of author-
ity to the Senate, and the word 'sole' indicates that the authority is reposed in the
Senate and nowhere else"). Additionally, the court observed that judicial review of
congressional impeachment proceedings would "be inconsistent with the Framers'
insistence that our system be one of checks and balances . . . [because] impeach-
ment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature."
Id. at 235.
67. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
68. See id. at 279 (finding that political gerrymandering claims present politi-
cal question).
69. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 935 (observing that foreign relations is-
sues constitutionally committed to elected branches are subject to political ques-
tion doctrine).
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monstratively committed to the Executive or Legislature."70 While
some foreign affairs cases may inextricably implicate these first two
Baker factors, the Court cautioned in Baker that "it is an error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign rela-
tions lies beyond judicial cognizance."71
Because the Constitution commits responsibility for setting the
nation's foreign policy to the political branches, as a general mat-
ter, cases are only deemed nonjusticiable if their adjudication
would require a court to: (1) make direct foreign policy decisions;
(2) directly challenge the merits or wisdom of a foreign policy deci-
sion already made; or (3) impermissibly interfere with the political
branches' conduct of foreign affairs. 72 Conversely, the lawsuit is
likely to be justiciable when a case has a more indirect or attenu-
ated connection to U.S. foreign policy and states a cause of action
in tort or another substantive doctrine that courts have experience
applying.73
When deciding a case on its merits requires a significant for-
eign policy decision, courts will find a political question.74 The Su-
preme Court has held, for example, that the political branches of
the government have the power to determine when a war has com-
menced and ended.75 The issue of "who is the sovereign of a terri-
tory" was found by the Court to be reserved to the political
70. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (clarifying why some foreign
relations issues implicate political question doctrine).
71. See id. (explaining how "sweeping statements" that all cases touching for-
eign affairs are political questions are incorrect and that justiciability determina-
tion requires "a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed"). The
Court also stated that an analysis of the justiciability of a foreign affairs case should
include consideration of the litigated issue's history of management by the politi-
cal branches, "its susceptibility to judicial handling in light of the nature and pos-
ture of the specific case," and the potential consequences of deciding the case. Id.
72. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 231-35 (providing overview of scenarios
where cases touching foreign affairs are most likely to be deemed nonjusticiable).
While these nonjusticiable cases almost invariably implicate the first prong of the
Baker test (constitutional commitment of issue to coequal branch), courts often
also find the presence of the second prong (lack ofjudicial standard or legal rule
to apply). See id.
73. See id. at 230 (explaining that litigation centering on tort or property
claims attenuated from foreign affairs issue is less likely to raise political question).
74. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 140-41 (noting various factual scenarios
where adjudication would require foreign policy decision and courts have thus
invoked political question doctrine).
75. See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 19 (1827) (holding that authority to deter-
mine commencement of hostilities is vested in political branches and therefore
nonjusticiable).
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branches whose determination "conclusively binds the courts."76
The Supreme Court also held that, because Article II of the Consti-
tution gives the Executive Branch the power to send and receive
ambassadors, courts should defer to the Secretary of State regard-
ing a person's diplomatic status.77 Finally, federal courts will follow
the political branches' judgment of whether a treaty is still in
force.78
Additionally, courts invoke the political question doctrine
when a litigant directly challenges the wisdom or legality of a con-
gressional or presidential foreign policy decision.79 In Dickson v.
Ford,80 a taxpayer brought an Establishment Clause challenge
against a congressional enactment authorizing emergency military
aid to Israel.81 The Fifth Circuit found the claim posed a nonjusti-
ciable political question by directly challenging the President and
Congress's policy decision to "maintain Israel's self-defense capac-
ity." 8 2 The court explained that judicial review of the aid policy
would implicate the first (constitutional commitment of issue to co-
equal branch), second (lack of applicable judicial standard), and
fifth (need for government to speak with single voice) Baker
factors.83
76. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326-28 (1939) (finding that Presi-
dent's recognition of foreign governments was not reviewable because "conduct of
foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the political departments").
77. In Re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 430 (1890) (observing that courts must accept
certification of State Department as dispositive on issue of diplomatic status be-
cause such determinations are left to Executive Branch discretion).
78. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) (explaining how treaty
status is political question and power to determine these matters was not confided
in judiciary); see also N.Y. Chinese TVPrograms, Inc. v. UE. Enterprises, Inc., 954 F.2d
847, 852 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that treaty between U.S. and Taiwan remained in
effect, despite former no longer recognizing latter, because American political
branches clearly wanted to preserve treaty).
79. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding di-
rect challenge to President's foreign policy decision nonjusticiable). In DaCosta,
the Second Circuit invoked the political question doctrine in response to the plain-
tiff's claim that President Nixon's temporary escalation of the Vietnam War was
illegal. See id. at 1147. Besides noting "the Constitution's specific textual commit-
ment of decision-making responsibility ... in a theatre of war to the President," the
court also emphasized that it lacked discoverable and manageable standards for
deciding "whether a specific military operation constitutes an 'escalation' of the
war." Id. at 1154-55.
80. 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975).
81. See id. at 235 (describing plaintiffs' Establishment Clause challenge to con-
gressional act giving emergency military aid to Israel).
82. See id. at 236 (observing that plaintiffs' claim directly challenged foreign
policy decision of political branches).
83. See id. (explaining how political question doctrine barred lawsuit because
adjudicating it would implicate first, second, and fifth Baker factors).
12
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The political question doctrine is unlikely to be implicated
when a case touches on foreign policy in a more attenuated man-
ner; involves the violation of an individual right; and requires the
application of a legal standard or rule that the judiciary has an ex-
tensive history of utilizing.84 In Klinghoffer v. S.NC. Achille Lauro
(Klinghoffer), 85 the Second Circuit refused to invoke the doctrine to
dismiss the plaintiffs' tort claims against the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) for its seizure of an Italian cruise ship and the
killing of one of the ship's passengers.86 While the plaintiffs' claims
touched on foreign policy issues and arose in a politically charged
context, the court explained that this "does not convert what is es-
sentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable political ques-
tion."8 7 The court observed that the crucial first Baker factor did
not apply because deciding ordinary tort suits has been constitu-
tionally committed to "none other than. . . the Judiciary."88
In Kadic v. Karadi6 (Kadic),89 the Second Circuit again refused
to find a political question when presented with a claim for human
rights violations against the commander of the Bosnian-Serb mili-
tary forces during the Bosnian Civil War.90 The court explained
84. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 562 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
no political question where property claims touched on international relations is-
sues). In Alperin, the Ninth Circuit held that conversion and unjust enrichment
claims filed by Holocaust survivors against the Vatican Bank, regarding treasure it
allegedly obtained from a Nazi puppet regime during World War II, were not polit-
ical questions. See id. at 539-44. The court explained that, because "the Property
Claims simply seek restitution for looted assets" and do not encroach on the for-
eign policy prerogatives of the political branches, "[d]eciding this sort of contro-
versy is exactly what courts do." Id. at 551. Additionally, the court observed that
property law provided "concrete legal bases for courts to reach a reasoned deci-
sion." See id. at 554-55. The Ninth Circuit also stated that the presence of clear
standards for adjudication obviated the need for it to make an initial policy deci-
sion (the third Baker factor). Id.
85. 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
86. See id. at 46-47 (summarizing plaintiffs claims arising from PLO's hi-
jacking of cruise ship, during which American passenger was killed).
87. Id. at 49 (emphasizing that international and politically charged context
of case is insufficient for demonstrating nonjusticiability).
88. Id. (stating resolution of torts cases is constitutionally committed tojudici-
ary and "[t]his factor alone . . . strongly suggests that the political question doc-
trine does not apply"). The court also observed that the district court would not
be required to render a decision without "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" because the common law of torts provides clear and well-settled rules.
Id.
89. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
90. See id. at 236-37 (finding claims brought by Croat and Muslim citizens of
Bosnia-Herzegovina under Alien Tort Claims Act justiciable and not barred by po-
litical question doctrine). The claims at issue alleged human rights violations
stemming from orders by the President of the self-proclaimed, break-away Bosnia-
Serb republic of Srpska. Id.
3332011]
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that "universally recognized norms of international law provide ju-
dicially discoverable and manageable standards."9 1 The Second
Circuit also found that the existence of judicial standards for decid-
ing the case "obviates any need to make initial policy decisions" and
"undermines the claim that such suits relate to matters that are con-
stitutionally committed to another branch."92
C. The Political Question Doctrine and Environmental Public
Nuisance Actions
Outside the context of climate change litigation, federal courts
have not invoked the political question doctrine in public nuisance-
based pollution cases, even when the ruling was likely to have sub-
stantial interstate environmental and economic effects.93 In Mis-
souri v. Illinois (Missouri),94 the Supreme Court heard a public
nuisance action brought by Missouri that sought to restrain Chi-
cago from discharging its sewage into a tributary of the Mississippi
River.95 The Court did not deem this case nonjusticiable despite
the "international importance" of the alleged nuisance.96 One year
later, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (Tennessee Copper),9 Georgia
filed a suit against a Tennessee company whose noxious gas emis-
sions were destroying its forests, orchards, and crops.98 Despite the
significant environmental and economic interests implicated in the
case, the Court did not find a political question and instead granted
91. Id. at 249 (explaining how second Baker factor-absence of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards-is inapplicable because universally recog-
nized norms of international law are available for adjudicating plaintiffs' claims).
92. Id. (stating that presence of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for adjudicating case rendered third Baker factor-whether deciding case
requires initial policy decision-inapplicable). The court also asserted that the
existence of judicially manageable standards significantly undermines any argu-
ment that the first Baker factor-textual constitutional commitment of issue to co-
equal political branch-is present. Id.
93. See Thorpe, supra note 6, at 101 (observing that courts have decided many
toxic tort and nuisance-based pollution cases).
94. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
95. Id. at 517 (describing case's factual background). Missouri also alleged
that if Chicago's proposed discharge were to occur, "1,500 tons of poisonous filth"
would be sent daily into the Mississippi River. Id. According to Missouri, this sew-
age would so pollute the river water that it would be "unfit for drinking, agricul-
ture, or manufacturing purposes." Id.
96. Id. at 518 (describing claim's potential international significance). Writ-
ing for the Court,Justice Holmes remarked that Missouri's claim would be of inter-
national importance if proven because it regarded "a visible change of a great river
from a pure stream into a polluted and poisoned ditch." Id.
97. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
98. See id. at 236 (explaining factual basis of injunction Georgia sought
against Tennessee copper companies).
14
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Georgia's proposed injunction. 9 Sixty-five years later, the Supreme
Court allowed another complicated pollution-based public nui-
sance claim to proceed on the merits in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
(Milwaukee).' 00 There, Illinois sought an injunction to prevent the
city of Milwaukee from continuing its practice of dumping "some
200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage" into
Lake Michigan. 01
Prior to the Second Circuit's ruling in American Electric, district
courts decided and dismissed three climate change-public nuisance
cases (including the lower court's decision in American Electric) on
political question grounds.1 0 2 In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,' 03 Gulf
Coast property owners brought public nuisance, trespass, and civil
conspiracy claims against oil, coal, and chemical companies for
their GHG emissions.104 The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi held the case was nonjusticiable because it
raised a political question. 05 Likewise, in California v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 0 6 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia invoked the doctrine to dismiss an action by California
against various automakers for contributing to the public nuisance
of global warming.10 7 The court relied heavily on the district
court's reasoning from American Electric and, accordingly, held that
the third Baker factor (need for initial policy decision) rendered the
lawsuit nonjusticiable. 0 The court reasoned that deciding the
99. See id. at 239 (granting Georgia's injunction).
100. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
101. Id. at 93 (describing Illinois's allegation and desired injunctive relief).
Illinois brought its complaint under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and
the Court exercised its discretion to remit the parties to an appropriate district
court. Id. at 108. Before doing so, however, the Court for the first time recognized
the tort of public nuisance as part of the federal common law. Id.
102. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding climate change nuisance action to raise nonjusticiable
political question); Calfomia v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJ, 2007 WL
2726871, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (holding global warming tort claim
nonjusticiable because it impermissibly implicates policy issues consigned solely to
political branches); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007
WL 6942285, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) (holding plaintiffs claims non-justici-
able under political question doctrine).
103. No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007).
104. See id. at *1 (describing plaintiffs' claims).
105. See id. (granting defendants' motion to dismiss).
106. No. C06-05755 MJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
107. Id. at *1 (providing factual background of California's claim).
108. See id. at *6 (stating that third Baker factor "largely controls the analysis in
the current case due to the complexity of the initial global warming policy deter-
minations that must be made by the elected branches prior to the proper adjudica-
tion of the Plaintiffs federal common law nuisance claim").
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case would require the judge to balance competing environmental,
economic, foreign relations, and national security interests, which
the elected branches must speak on first. 09
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In American Electric, the Second Circuit provided a detailed
analysis of the political question doctrine, the issue upon which the
lower court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim." 0 The court first pro-
vided a brief background of the doctrine along with the constella-
tions of facts that prompted its application."' The court then
analyzed the plaintiffs' complaint under each Baker factor and ulti-
mately determined that none were applicable.112 This finding
prompted the Second Circuit to conclude that the district court er-
roneously applied the political question doctrine to bar the plain-
tiffs' claim.1 13
A. Second Circuit's Overview of the Political Question Doctrine
After noting that the political question doctrine is "primarily a
function of the separation of powers," the court briefly discussed
the doctrine's historical origins." 4 The Second Circuit then identi-
fied the Supreme Court's Baker decision as providing the modern
framework for resolving political question issues." 5 After laying
out the six Baker factors, the Second Circuit cautioned that "Baker
set a high bar for nonjusticiability" by requiring at least one of the
factors to be "inextricable" from the case."6 In support of this in-
ference, the Second Circuit observed that "the Supreme Court has
109. See id. at *7 (discussing interests that court would need to balance in
adjudicating case). The court concluded that it was impossible and improper for it
to determine the relative weight to assign each of those interests without an initial
policy decision by the elected branches. Id.
110. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 321-32 (2d Cir.
2009) (discussing political question issue).
111. See id. at 321-23 (providing overview of political question doctrine).
112. See id. at 324-32 (applying Baker factors to facts of case and deeming all
inapplicable).
113. See id. at 332 (holding that political question doctrine did not bar case
from reaching merits stage).
114. See id. at 321 (discussing political question doctrine's primary purpose as
preserving separation of powers, along with doctrine's historical roots).
115. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 321 (observing how Baker Court attempted to
identify and describe attributes of doctrine).
116. See id. (quoting six Baker factors and noting how Baker indicated that
these factors should be difficult to invoke).
16
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only rarely found that a political question bars its adjudication of an
issue."' 17
The court next stated that the defendants' arguments
"touch [ed] upon" the two most frequently litigated areas of the po-
litical question doctrine: "domestic controversies implicating consti-
tutional issues and the conduct of foreign policy."" 8  When
resolving political question issues surrounding domestic controver-
sies, the Second Circuit explained, courts usually analyze the lan-
guage of the Constitution to look for a textual commitment to
another governmental branch.119 The court noted, however, that
"not all cases touching [domestic] constitutional issues" raise politi-
cal questions, even where they also raise issues of great importance
to the political branches and have motivated partisan debate. 12 0 In
cases implicating foreign policy issues, the court stated that a politi-
cal question is sometimes found where adjudication would require
the review of legislative and executive policy choices and value de-
terminations.12 ' The Second Circuit concluded its overview of the
political question doctrine by quoting Baker's cautionary statement
that "it is an error to suppose that every case or controversy that
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 22
B. Application of the First Baker Factor: Is There a Textually
Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment of the Issue
to a Coordinate Political Department?
The court began its analysis by observing that the first Baker
factor was "the dominant consideration in any political question in-
quiry." 23 It then proceeded to waive the defendants' argument
that the issue of climate change regulation was textually committed
117. See id. at 321-22 (commenting on how Supreme Court has invoked politi-
cal question doctrine only twice in last forty-plus years).
118. See id. at 322 (expressing that defendants' political question arguments
touched upon domestic controversies, which implicate constitutional issues and
foreign affairs).
119. Id. (describing how courts determine whether political question doctrine
should be invoked in domestic constitutional controversies).
120. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 322 (observing that not every issue implicating
Constitution and motivating partisan debate raises political question).
121. See id. (describing cases where doctrine was invoked because courts
would have had to review foreign policy decision of political branches).
122. Id. at 323 (quoting Baker's cautionary statement regarding breadth of
doctrine in foreign affairs context).
123. Id. at 324 (quoting Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1991))
(relating that first Baker factor is most important of all six factors).
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to Congress by way of the Commerce Clause.' 2 4 The court next
addressed the defendants' contention that allowing the plaintiffs to
use a federal nuisance action to reduce domestic GHG emissions
"will impermissibly interfere with the President's authority to man-
age foreign relations."' 25 The Second Circuit replied that the de-
fendants' arguments vastly overstated the scope of the plaintiffs'
claim and all but ignored the "discrete domestic nuisance issues ac-
tually presented." 26 The plaintiffs' complaint, according to the
court, did not "ask the court to fashion a comprehensive and far-
reaching solution to global climate change." 127 Furthermore, the
court maintained that the defendants' foreign affairs interference
argument was misguided because a victory by the plaintiffs on the
merits "[would] not establish a national or international emissions
policy."128
The relationship between the foreign policy concerns raised by
the defendants and the relief requested by the plaintiffs, the court
concluded, was too "tangential and attenuated" to invoke the politi-
cal question doctrine. 129 In concluding its analysis of the first Baker
factor, the court quoted Klinghoffer's assertion that "[t]he depart-
ment to whom [the] issue has been 'constitutionally committed' is
124. See id. (finding defendants' Commerce Clause textual commitment argu-
ment waived). Because the defendants' briefs failed to explain how the issue was
textually committed to Congress by the Commerce Clause, the court found that
this assertion had been insufficiently argued. Id. Pursuant to an earlier Second
Circuit case, "[i]ssues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived
and normally will not be addressed on appeal." Id. (quoting Norton v. Sam's Club,
145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d. Cir. 1998)).
125. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 322 (describing defendants' argument that
plaintiffs' claim implicated first Baker factor by impermissibly interfering with Presi-
dent's foreign affairs powers). The defendants claimed adjudication would pro-
duce this interference because three Presidents, with the approval of Congress,
have employed a multilateral strategy for addressing global warming. Id. As part
of this strategy, the U.S. refuses to commit to unilateral, mandatory emissions re-
ductions. See id. The defendants argued that because the plaintiffs' claims de-
manded "unilateral reductions in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions," they threatened
to undermine this international strategy by leaving the President with less Ameri-
can emissions cuts to offer in exchange for reductions by other nations. Id.
126. Id. at 325 (rejecting defendants' characterization of lawsuit as magnify-
ing and distorting real issues at stake).
127. Id. (articulating appropriate scope of plaintiffs' claims). The court ob-
served that fashioning a comprehensive solution to climate change is a task that
"arguably falls within the purview of the political branches." Id
128. See id. (stating that plaintiff victory would not establish national or inter-
national GHG emissions policy). Such a ruling, the court continued, would also
not require mandatory, unilateral emissions reductions for entities not party to the
lawsuit. Id.
129. Id. (explaining why defendants' foreign policy concerns are insufficient
to invoke political question doctrine).
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none other than our own-the Judiciary."13 0  Accordingly, the
court found no textual commitment in the Constitution conferring
to the political branches exclusive authority over disputes arising
from GHG emissions or other forms of alleged nuisance.1 3 1
C. Application of the Second Baker Factor: Is There a Lack of
Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards for
Resolving the Case?
The court began its analysis of the second Baker factor by out-
lining the defendants' arguments.' 3 2 The utility companies main-
tained that, given the uncertainty surrounding the precise effect of
GHGs on the climate and the myriad of public policy questions a
court would confront while adjudicating the plaintiffs' claim,
"vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts" derived from the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts were a woefully inadequate standard
for decision.' 3 3 The Second Circuit found this argument unpersua-
sive for several reasons.134 First, the court noted that "federal
courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public
nuisance cases for over a century." 1 35 The court cited the Supreme
Court decisions in Missouri, Tennessee Copper, and Milwaukee as sup-
porting the proposition that courts have long "employed familiar
public nuisance precepts, grappled with complex scientific evi-
dence, and resolved the issues presented." 36
130. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 325 (quoting Klinghoffer's assertion that issue is con-
stitutionally committed to Judiciary).
131. See id. (concluding that disputes arising from GHG emissions are not
textually committed by Constitution to political branches).
132. See id. at 326 (setting up analysis of second Baker factor by describing
defendants' arguments).
133. See id. (providing defendants' primary argument for why second Baker
factor-lack of judicially manageable standards-applies). According to the de-
fendants, some policy questions a court deciding the plaintiffs' claims would have
to answer included: "How fast should emissions be reduced?; Should power plants
or automobiles be required to reduce emissions?; Who should bear the cost of
reduction?; and How are the impacts on jobs, the economy, and the nation's secur-
ity to be balanced against the risks of future harms?" Id.
134. See id. at 329 (expressing disagreement with the defendants that there
are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving this case).
135. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 326 (observing that courts have extensive experi-
ence adjudicating complex public nuisance cases).
136. Id. at 326-27 (providing facts and holdings from cases that Second Cir-
cuit deemed evidence of "a long line of federal common law of nuisance cases").
The court's discussion of Missouri v. Illinois and Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co. focused
on the complex scientific and expert evidence the Supreme Court was required to
analyze. Id. The Second Circuit's analysis of these two cases also emphasized how
the Supreme Court had to balance the plaintiffs' need for a clean environment
with the economic harm of too stringent pollution restrictions. Id.
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Next, the Second Circuit determined that the Restatement
(Second) of Torts' definition of public nuisance ("an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public")' 3 7 pro-
vided a workable standard from which a district court could resolve
this case.' 38 Furthermore, the court cited Klinghoffer as demonstra-
tive of the federal courts' willingness and capacity to apply well-set-
tled tort rules to a variety of new and complex problems.'" 9 After
quoting Klinghoffer's reasoning that the applicability of tort law's
"clear and well settled rules" to the dispute meant judicially discov-
erable standards were present, the Second Circuit held that the de-
fendants were not entitled to dismissal based on the second Baker
factor.140
D. Application of the Third Baker Factor: Is It Impossible to
Decide this Case Without an Initial Policy
Determination of a Kind Clearly for Nonjudicial
Discretion?
After acknowledging that the district court relied on the third
Baker factor for its nonjusticiability holding, the Second Circuit at-
tacked the lower court's reasoning and conclusion.' 4 ' Specifically,
the Second Circuit rejected the district court's assertions that: (1)
the plaintiffs' nuisance claims cannot be adjudicated until Congress
has supplied an initial policy decision on climate change and (2)
any judicial actions having the effect of regulating GHG emissions
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l) (1979) (defining public
nuisance).
138. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 328 (stating that Restatement's definition "provides
a workable standard"). The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Restatement's
public nuisance definition was broad. Id. Nevertheless, the court believed the def-
inition could be applied by the district court in a principled manner to resolve the
dispute at hand. Id. In support of this conclusion, the court cited United States v.
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 110 (D. Vt. 1973). Id. There, a district court
applied the Restatement's public nuisance standard in a lawsuit brought by the
U.S. to reduce pollution in Lake Champlain against an entity that owned and
leased vessels used to transport oil across the lake. Id. at 120-21.
139. See id. at 328-29 (describing facts and holding of Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Klinghoffer while emphasizing court's rejection of PLO's argument that
wrongful death claim was nonjusticiable because it arose in politically volatile con-
text of international terrorism).
140. Id. at 329-30 (agreeing with Klinghoffe/s statement that "because the
common law of tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court
can easily rely, this case does require the court to render a decision in the absence
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards").
141. See id. at 330 (observing that district court relied on third Baker factor-
impossibility of deciding case without initial policy determination-in dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint as political question).
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would be "counter[ ] [to] the political branches' refusal to act."14 2
According to the Second Circuit, legislative inaction toward GHG
emissions "falls far short" of what is needed to demonstrate a con-
gressional intent to supplant the common law. 143 The court ex-
plained that the plaintiffs need not "wait for the political branches
to craft a 'comprehensive' global solution to global warming."144
In rejecting the district court's assertion that a court-ordered
reduction in the defendants' GHG emissions would be contrary to
Congress's will, the Second Circuit contended that "the political
branches are at the very least concerned about global warming."145
Finally, the court observed that, because the plaintiffs' action is "an
ordinary tort suit" governed by "recognized judicial standards
under the federal common law of nuisance," this "obviates any
need to make initial. policy decisions of the kind normally reserved
for nonjudicial discretion."' 4 6 Accordingly, the third Baker factor
did not apply.147
142. Id. (summarizing district court's reasoning for finding third Baker factor
to bar adjudication).
143. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 330 (explaining how district court's emphasis on
Congress's purported refusal to act was erroneous and "result[ed] in a decision
resting on a particularly unstable ground"). To support this assertion, the court
cited Illinois v. City of Milwaukee as standing for the proposition that "if the extant
statutes governing water pollution do not cover a plaintiffs claims and provide a
remedy, a plaintiff is free to bring its claim in under the federal common law of
nuisance" and need not "await the fashioning of a comprehensive approach to
domestic water pollution." Id.
144. Id. at 331 (expressing thatjust because CAA and other pollution statutes
currently "do not provide Plaintiffs with the remedy they seek does not mean that
Plaintiffs cannot bring an action and must wait for the political branches to craft a
'comprehensive' global solution to global warming").
145. Id. (rejecting district court's assertion that Congress's failure to regulate
GHGs reflected policy determination that global warming should not be addressed
through American GHG reductions). The Second Circuit also stated that the Ex-
ecutive Branch and Congress have given no indication they wish U.S. carbon emis-
sions to increase. Id. As evidence of the political branches' concern about climate
change and GHGs, the court observed that "Congress has passed laws that call for
the study of climate change and research into technologies that will reduce emis-
sions." Id.
146. See id. at 329, 331 (expressing how existence of well-recognized judicial
standard provided by common law of public nuisance eliminated need for initial
policy decision).
147. See id. at 331 (holding third Baker factor inapplicable).
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E. Application of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Baker Factors: Will
Adjudication of This Case Demonstrate "Lack of Respect" for
the Political Branches; Contravene "An Unusual Need for
Unquestioning Adherence to a Political Decision Already
Made;" or "Embarrass" the Nation as a Result of "Multifarious
Pronouncements by Various Departments"?
The Second Circuit began by quoting from its opinion in Kadic
that the fourth through sixth Baker factors are only applicable when
adjudication "would contradict prior decisions taken by a political
branch in those limited contexts where such contradiction would
seriously interfere with important governmental interests."148 The
court noted that, according to the defendants, the plaintiffs' claims
met that standard because they contradicted "'U.S. policy [which]
is manifestly not to engage in unilateral reductions of domestic
emissions.' "149 The Second Circuit, however, was not persuaded
that there was, in fact, a unified U.S. policy on GHG emissions.150
Citing Alperin v. Vatican Bank (Alperin) 1'5 and Klinghoffer, the Sec-
ond Circuit then stated that when there is no unified national pol-
icy on a foreign affairs issue, adjudication does not implicate the
fourth through sixth Baker factors. 15 2 Finally, the court observed
that the prerogatives of the political branches did not need to be
protected by the political question doctrine in this case because
Congress or the Executive Branch were free to displace any com-
mon law standards the decision set by choosing to regulate
emissions. 153
148. Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 331 (quoting Kadic v. Karadfits explanation of
when Baker factors four through six are relevant).
149. See id. (conveying defendants' assertion that plaintiffs' lawsuit directly im-
plicated fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors because suit contradicted deliberate
policy set by political branches).
150. Id. at 331-32 (rejecting premise of defendants' argument by asserting no
clear U.S. policy toward GHG emissions exists). The court observed that the "vari-
egated" assertions made in the defendants' own briefs as to what constituted Amer-
ican GHG emissions policy "underscore[d] that there really is no unified policy."
Id. At various points in their briefs, the defendants asserted: (1) this country's
official policy is to reduce its generation of carbon emissions; (2) the political
branches have pursued a policy of research into climate change "as a prelude to
forming a coordinated, national policy[;]" and (3) in the international arena, U.S.
policy is to not engage in a unilateral reduction of domestic greenhouse gas emis-
sions. See id.
151. 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).
152. See id. at 332 (stating that fourth through sixth Baker factors are not ap-
plicable where no national policy exists).
153. Id. (making separation of powers argument against applying political
question doctrine on grounds that political branches may displace any common
law standards by enacting statutory or regulatory standards).
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's decision and reasoning on the political
question issue in American Electric were, in large part, justified. 154 By
carefully applying the political question doctrine's legal principles
to the novel issue of climate change litigation, the Second Circuit
provided the plaintiffs with a path to relief on the merits without
straying from the doctrine's precedential past. 155 The Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in American Electric, unlike the district court's deci-
sion, was true to the substance and spirit of Bakers six-factor
political question test.156 The opinion was also based on a proper
understanding of the political question doctrine precedents from
federal court decisions.157
A. The Second Circuit's Opinion was Consistent with the
Principles Articulated in Political Question Precedents
The Second Circuit's American Electric decision demonstrated
an understanding of the major principles underlying federal
courts' political question precedents. 15 8 The first of these princi-
ples reflected in the court's opinion is that the doctrine "is one of
'political questions,' not one of 'political cases."' 159 As a result,
courts cannot reject a bona fide controversy merely because it is
154. SeeJames R. May, New and Emerging Constitutional Theories and the Future of
Environmental Protection, 40 ENvTL. L. REP. NEws & ANALYSis 10989, 10991 (2010)
(observing that some federal courts "have incorrectly invoked the political ques-
tion doctrine" when declining to adjudicate climate change-based public nuisance
actions, while implying that Second Circuit's outcome in American Electric was
correct).
155. See Nathan Howe, The Political Question Doctrine's Role in Climate Change
Nuisance Litigation: Are Power Utilities the First of Many Casualties?, 40 ENvrL. L. REP.
NEWS AND ANALYsis 11229, 11230 (2010) (arguing American Electric court was cor-
rect in not applying political question doctrine to climate change lawsuit because
plaintiffs did not "directly challeng[e] decisions by the [political] branches related
to the military or foreign affairs").
156. See id. at 11233 (noting that Second Circuit's political question analysis
in American Electric conforms with historic approach to Baker test).
157. See May, supra note 154, at 10993 (asserting that American Electric was cor-
rectly decided because political question doctrine "should not serve as a bar to
climate cases due to a lack of both a demonstrable constitutional commitment to
an elected branch and countervailing prudential concerns").
158. For a discussion of how American Electric was consistent with the legal
principles underpinning federal courts' political question precedents, see infra
notes 159 and accompanying text.
159. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting distinction between
"political cases" and issues raising nonjusticiable "political questions").
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"denominated 'political."' 1 6 0 Rather, the term "political" appear-
ing in the doctrine's name refers to the Constitution's entrustment
of the litigated issue to the Legislative, or Executive Branch, the "po-
litical" branches.161 Its meaning does not "broadly relate to govern-
ment, government policy, partisan or party politics, or the political
system."162
Climate change has certainly become a partisan and divisive
issue in American politics, with Republicans substantially less likely
than Democrats to believe in the science behind it.163 Just because
climate change has become a partisan issue does not convert it into
a nonjusticiable political question, however.164 The district court
erred by implicitly making this assumption.165 The Second Circuit
correctly distinguished a political case from a political question by
holding that "the judiciary. . . can [not] decline to decide matters
within its jurisdiction simply because such matters may have politi-
cal ramifications."1 66
The Second Circuit's decision also correctly focused on the
plaintiffs' specific claim instead of the broader political and foreign
affairs context in which the claim arose.167 Using this analytical
framework was the proper approach because copious precedent es-
160. See id. (explaining how presence of term "political" in political question
doctrine does not render nonjusticiable cases "semantic[ally] catalogued" as
"political").
161. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 869-70 (5th Cir. 2009) (dis-
cussing meaning of political in political question doctrine).
162. Id. (distinguishing colloquial meaning of political with its meaning in
political question doctrine context).
163. SeeJames R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the Politi-
cal Question Doctrine, 85 DENv. U. L. REv. 919, 952 (2008) (describing how most
people would agree that "issues of climate change are controversial, complex, and
invite action by the elected branches"); see also Lexington, A Refreshing Dose of Hon-
esty: Maria Cantwell and the Politics of Global Warming, EcONoMisT, Feb. 6, 2010, at 69,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/15453166 (reporting that disbelief
in climate change is norm among Republicans, with only 35% believing solid evi-
dence of warming exists according to Pew poll).
164. See May, supra note 163, at 952 (observing that it is largely irrelevant
whether issue is complex or political when determining if political question doc-
trine applies).
165. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270-73
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (appearing to base determination that initial policy decision re-
garding climate change must be made by elected branches on politicized nature of
issue).
166. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir. 2009)
(rejecting district court's reasoning and explaining proper application of political
question doctrine).
167. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 248 (describing how precedents over-
whelmingly indicate that specific claim, and not broader context of claim, controls
political question analysis).
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tablishes that "the political question doctrine bars judicial review
only when the precise matter to be decided has been constitution-
ally committed" to one of the political branches. 168 The district
court, therefore, was incorrect in virtually ignoring the plaintiffs'
precise public nuisance claim. That court mistakenly focused on
the purported "legislative nature of [the] litigation," and the poten-
tial "economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security
interests" it "touched on."1 69 The Second Circuit, in contrast, per-
formed the proper political question analysis by concentrating on
the "discrete domestic nuisance" claim presented, and by refusing
to characterize the lawsuit as implicating "complex, inter-related
and far-reaching policy questions."170
B. The Court Properly Applied the Baker Factors to the
Nuisance-based Climate Change Action
The manner in which the Second Circuit applied each of the
Baker factors to the plaintiffs' claim was consistent with precedent
and reflected a nuanced understanding of the political question
doctrine.17' As discussed in the subsection above, when the court
applied the first Baker factor (textual commitment of issue to a po-
litical branch), it correctly focused on the plaintiffs' specific claim
and not the peripheral issues the lawsuit touched upon.'72 In the
context of the first Baker prong analysis, the Second Circuit ad-
dressed whether the issue of climate change-causing emissions was
constitutionally committed to the political branches as part of their
foreign affairs power.'73 In determining that it was not, the court
168. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Zivotosky v. Secretary of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Edwards, J.,
concurring)) (explaining how political question inquiry should focus on specific
claim).
169. See Am. Elec., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272-74 (characterizing plaintiffs' claim by
focusing on its context and background); see also LaTourette, supra note 41, at 249-
50 (arguing that dismissals of climate change cases by district courts on political
question grounds, including American Electric decision, were based on misconstruc-
tion of doctrine).
170. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 325 (characterizing plaintiffs' claim and re-
jecting defendants' proposed characterization).
171. See Howe, supra note 155, at 11233 (observing that Second Circuit dis-
cussed Baker factors in detail and assessed them independently, while also giving
consideration to doctrine's classical and prudential strands).
172. For an explanation of how the American Electric court properly identified
the scope of plaintiffs' lawsuit, see supra notes 167 and accompanying text.
173. See Howe, supra note 155, at 11237 (describing how Second Circuit
found political question doctrine inapplicable after it determined that adjudicat-
ing case would not directly interfere with Executive Branch's international climate
change policy).
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accurately based its conclusion on factors articulated in prior politi-
cal question cases implicating foreign policy issues.174 Specifically,
the court observed that the plaintiffs' claims were not a direct chal-
lenge to any foreign policy set by Congress or the President, and
would not impermissibly interfere with the political branches' con-
duct of foreign relations.17 5
The Second Circuit should have addressed the defendants' ar-
gument that the Constitution commits the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause to the political branches, however.176 Two years
before the American Electric decision, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Northern California held that the political question doc-
trine barred a global warming nuisance action, in part because ad-
judication "would have an inextricable effect on interstate
commerce... [an] issue[ ] constitutionally committed to the politi-
cal branches of government. "177 Prior to that decision, the Com-
merce Clause had never been invoked by a court to find a
constitutional commitment to Congress in the political question
context.178 Allowing the Commerce Clause, which serves as the
constitutional basis for much of Congress's legislation, to play such
a role in the justiciability analysis would vastly expand the reach of
the political question doctrine. 79
Other factors beyond the absence of precedent indicate that
such an application is erroneous. 80 For example, in Nixon v. United
States,18 the D.C. Circuit stated that, in the context of analyzing the
first Baker factor, "no one reasonably would suggest that it is beyond
174. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 229-30 (explaining how courts have ap-
plied first Baker factor in foreign affairs context by citing numerous cases that
would later be relied on by Second Circuit in American Electric).
175. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 325 n.3 (observing that in many cases where
courts have found nonjusticiable political questions, plaintiffs sued U.S. govern-
ment or officials and thereby directly challenged political branches' foreign pol-
icy). The court explained that the plaintiffs' case, however, "presents at best an
indirect challenge." Id.
176. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's dismissal of the defendants'
Commerce Clause argument, see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
177. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007)
178. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 251 n.4 (1993) (White, J., concur-
ring) (implying that congressional legislation under Commerce Clause is not sub-
ject to political question doctrine).
179. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 44, at 242 (discussing how Commerce
Clause has been used to justify broad range of federal legislation).
180. For a discussion of other reasons why the use of the Commerce Clause in
California v. Gen. Motors Corp. as a ground for invoking the political question doc-
trine was legally erroneous, see supra notes 177 and accompanying text.
181. 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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the authority of the courts to review congressional enactments regu-
lating interstate commerce."182 Despite the weakness of the de-
fendants' argument in American Electric, the Second Circuit should
have addressed (and rejected) it.18 Doing so could have helped
prevent another district court from erroneously finding that the
Commerce Clause precludes adjudication of climate change nui-
sance claims.184
The American Electric court's analysis of the second Baker factor,
which asks whether a manageable standard exists by which the judi-
ciary can resolve the case, was also well-reasoned. 85 By consulting
other Second Circuit precedents, such as Klinghoffer, the court con-
cluded that a claim based in tort is inherently judicially discoverable
and manageable.'8 6 A long line of political question cases further
demonstrate that the unique, complex, or highly politicized nature
of the litigated issue should not control a court's application of the
second Baker factor.' 8 7
By referencing intricate environmental cases including Mis-
souri and Tennessee Copper, the Second Circuit supported its finding
in American Electric that the tort of public nuisance provides a man-
ageable standard for confronting the scientific and political com-
plexities of climate change.188 In those cases, the Supreme Court
successfully applied the public nuisance standard to resolve vexing
disputes over interstate water and air pollution involving invisible
pollutants.' 89 By implication, these cases established the principle
182. Id. at 254 (explaining that court unequivocally has power to review con-
gressional action under Commerce Clause).
183. For a discussion of why there is no basis in law or policy for applying the
political question doctrine to Commerce Clause cases, see supra notes 176 and
accompanying text.
184. For an example of how the district court misapplied the Commerce
Clause as a basis for finding a political question, see supra note 177 and accompa-
nying text.
185. For a description of why the author believes the Second Circuit's ap-
proach to the second Baker factor was well-reasoned, see infra notes 186 and ac-
companying text.
186. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 328-29 (2d Cir.
2009) (describing facts and holding of Klinghoffer and quoting opinion regarding
how tort law provides clear and well-settled rules for adjudication).
187. LaTourette, supra note 41, at 254 (expressing that second Baker prong
analysis is not based on claim's complexity).
188. See Am. Elec., 582 F.3d at 326-27 (describing facts and holdings of Missouri
and Tennessee Copper while emphasizing scientific complexity of cases).
189. For further discussion of the facts and holdings of Missouri and Tennessee
Copper, see supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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that a complex factual background does not render. a time-tested
judicial standard unmanageable. 90
Given the causal complexities and global scope of climate
change, a reasonable person might question whether the facts of
the interstate air and water pollution cases relied upon by the court
were sufficiently similar to the public nuisance action it was decid-
ing.' 91 This concern is misplaced because the Second Circuit's de-
termination that GHG emissions are legally indistinguishable from
other air pollutants draws strong support from the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (Massachusetts).192 In this seminal
case, the Court held that GHGs are air pollutants under the Clean
Air Act (CAA) and consequently must be regulated by the U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) like any other air pollu-
tant.193 The Second Circuit, therefore, was justified in finding a
manageable standard for adjudication of the plaintiffs' claim based
on a tort standard with a rich history of application in interstate
pollution litigation.194
The Second Circuit's analysis of the third Baker factor, the
need for the court to make an initial policy decision unsuitable for
the judiciary, is particularly important because it was the factor the
190. See May, supra note 163, at 957 (relating rich history of cases in which
federal courts have imposed injunctions against interstate polluters).
191. See, e.g., Matthew Hall, A Catastrophic Conundrum, But Not a Nuisance: Why
the Judicial Branch is Ill-Suited to Set Emissions Restrictions on Domestic Energy Producers
Through the Common Law Nuisance Doctrine, 13 CHAP. L. REv. 265, 284 (2010) (con-
tending that "climate change occupies different realm than direct pollution
cases"); John Gray, The Use of Public Nuisance Suits to Address Climate Change: Are
These Really "Ordinary Tort Cases"?, in THE LEGAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE, 2010
ED.: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING NEW LAWS, AVOIDING LIABILITY, AND ANTicI-
PATING FuTURE CHANGES FOR CLIENTS (INSIDE THE MINDS) 4 (Aspatore 2010) (argu-
ing that "Second Circuit trivialized climate change suits as 'ordinary tort cases' and
saw little distinction between the geographically discrete air and water pollution
cases of yesteryear and today's planet-wide climate claims").
192. 549 U.S. 497 (2007); seeJoy C. Fuhr, Connecticut v. EPA: The New Normal?,
24 NAT. RESOURCEs & ENv'T 58, 59 (2010) (explaining how Second Circuit's anal-
ogy between climate change-causing GHG and traditional air and water pollution
is supported by Massachusetts v. EPA).
193. See Fuhr, supra note 192, at 59 (describing Supreme Court's holding in
Massachusetts and how it relates to Second Circuit's American Electric decision).
194. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 326 (2d Cir.
2009) (arguing that public nuisance tort provides courts with manageable stan-
dard to resolve climate change cases because it has been used by federal courts for
nearly two centuries). Conversely, the district court, in its manageability analysis,
allowed the complexity of the claim's subject matter to obscure the traditional
public nuisance theory upon which it was based. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at
262-63.
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district court relied on in finding a political question.19 5 Strong
precedent exists regarding the application of this Baker factor, in-
cluding the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic.19 6 The Kadic court
focused on the underlying claims asserted by the plaintiffs, rather
than the case's geopolitical context, and concluded that the pres-
ence of judicially manageable standards "obviates any need to make
initial policy decisions of the kind normally reserved for nonjudicial
discretion."1 9 7 Likewise, in Alperin, the Ninth Circuit held that the
court need not make an initial policy decision to resolve the plain-
tiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims because property law
provided a "concrete legal basis for courts to reach a reasoned deci-
sion."1 98 Accordingly, the Second Circuit's finding in American Elec-
tric that the presence of the judicially manageable and well-defined
public nuisance tort obviated the need to make an initial policy de-
cision properly reflected courts' traditional application of the third
Baker factor.199
Finally, the Second Circuit correctly applied Baker factors four
through six, which collectively ask whether deciding a case would
contradict a political branch's prior decisions and seriously inter-
fere with important governmental interests. 200 In accordance with
these factors, the Second Circuit ascertained whether a ruling re-
stricting the defendants' GHG emissions would conflict with any ex-
isting U.S. global warming policy. 201 While Congress enacted some
legislation regarding climate change prior to the court's decision,
these laws merely called for studies, monitoring, and reports on
global warming.202 As for the U.S.'s international response to cli-
195. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that third Baker factor is "particularly pertinent to this
case").
196. See Kadic v. Karadfie, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that exis-
tence of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for adjudicating case
can render third Baker factor-whether deciding case requires initial policy deci-
sion-inapplicable).
197. Id. (applying third Baker factor to plaintiffs' claims).
198. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing
how property law provides sufficiently manageable standards so third Baker factor
is inapplicable to plaintiffs' claims).
199. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 266 (describing that when claim is
based on judicially manageable legal theory, courts need not wait for a policy deci-
sion from political branches).
200. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (relating when Baker factors four through six would
apply).
201. For a discussion of the court's decision regarding whether adjudication
of a climate change action would directly interfere with U.S. foreign policy, see
supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
202. See LaTourette, supra note 41, at 279 (summarizing congressional enact-
ments touching on climate change as "predominately exploratory in nature").
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mate change, the district court quoted an EPA statement issued
during George W. Bush's administration. 203 At that time, the EPA
said that a unilateral reduction of domestic GHG emissions could
"weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to re-
duce the [greenhouse gas] intensity of their economies."204
Because these statutes and executive branch policies do not di-
rectly address the regulation of carbon emissions, the Second Cir-
cuit correctly observed that "there really is no unified policy on
greenhouse gas emissions."205 Furthermore, even if it were U.S.
policy not to engage in unilateral emissions reductions without con-
current reductions by developing nations, that has no bearing on
the outcome of the analysis.206 A decision by a federal district court
on a public nuisance claim brought by domestic plaintiffs for do-
mestic conduct does not establish a national or international emis-
sions policy. 207 The Second Circuit, therefore, had a solid basis for
determining that adjudication on the merits of the plaintiffs' cli-
mate change action will not directly conflict with any existing U.S.
foreign policy. 208
VI. IMPACT
By allowing the plaintiffs' claims to proceed on the merits, the
Second Circuit's American Electric decision has the potential to
greatly enhance the viability of climate change-based public nui-
There has been no prescriptive legislation regulating GHG emissions, nor has a
law been passed stating that mandatory emissions constraints are unnecessary. See
id.
203. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (providing EPA's position during George W. Bush's administra-
tion on international affairs impact of regulating domestic GHG).
204. Id. (quoting EPA statement regarding political, economic, and foreign
relations implications of climate change). That court also observed that the U.S.
Senate refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol after it was signed by President Bill
Clinton on the grounds that the treaty forced developed nations to shoulder the
entire cost of emissions reductions. See id. at 269.
205. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 331-32 (2d Cir. 2009)
(asserting that U.S. lacks GHG emissions policy).
206. See id. at 325 (concluding that court decision in plaintiffs' favor would
not impact U.S. foreign policy).
207. See id. (stating that district court decision on plaintiffs' claim would not
result in unilateral reduction in domestic emissions, even assuming emissions caps
were placed on defendants).
208. For an explanation of the American Electric court's analysis and conclu-
sion that the fourth and sixth Baker factors were well-reasoned and consistent with
precedent, see supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
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sance actions.209 Prior to this decision, courts dismissed similar
claims at the pleadings stage by invoking the political question doc-
trine. 210 By finding the doctrine inapplicable, the Second Circuit
removed a previously insurmountable barrier from the path of cli-
mate change plaintiffs within that circuit and perhaps nationally.211
A. American Electric's Likely Effect on Future Climate Change
Actions
The impact of the Second Circuit's decision on public nui-
sance-based climate change actions will depend largely on how
widely its political question doctrine reasoning is adopted by federal
courts.2 1 2 As of the date of publication, the evidence regarding this
issue is somewhat mixed, but nevertheless indicates that many
courts may find American Electric's analysis persuasive.213 In Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,214 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California rejected the Second Circuit's
reasoning and held that the political question doctrine barred a
climate change-based public nuisance action.215 The Kivalina
plaintiffs filed an appeal, which is presently before the Ninth Cir-
cuit.2 1 6 Conversely, a Fifth Circuit panel in Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA217 adopted substantial aspects of the Second Circuit's political
question reasoning and held that climate change plaintiffs were not
209. See Gray, supra note 191, at 2 (observing that, because of Second Circuit's
decision in American Electric, "prospects for successful climate change litigation
have improved dramatically").
210. See Nancy G. Milburn, Connecticut v. AEP Decision, COLUMBIA J. OF ENvrL.
L. FIELD REPs., (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/arti-
cles/connecticut-v-aep-decision (describing how courts traditionally dismissed cli-
mate change actions at pleading stage prior to American Electric decision).
211. See May, supra note 163, at 922 (discussing how district courts often in-
voked political question doctrine against climate change plaintiffs, rendering
cause of action "dead on arrival").
212. See generally Evin A. Gaynor et al., Challenges Plaintiffs Face in Litigating
Federal Common-Law Climate Change Claims, 40 EN'vrL. L. REP. NEwS & ANALYSIS
10845, 1084748 (2010) (discussing implications of Second Circuit's American Elec-
tric opinion on other federal courts' approach to climate change litigation).
213. See generally id. at 10850 (describing application of American Electric's rea-
soning by Fifth Circuit in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA).
214. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
215. See id. at 875-77 (refusing to follow political question doctrine analysis of
Second Circuit in American Electric). In Kivalina, an Alaskan native village brought
an action against oil, energy, and utility companies under the federal common law
of public nuisance. Id. at 868-70. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' GHG
emissions contributed to global warming, which was causing erosion of Arctic sea
ice. Id.
216. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10849 (describing Ninth Circuit's current
review of Kivalina).
217. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
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barred by the doctrine. 218 While American Electric has already had
an important impact on the direction of climate change litigation,
this trend will intensify if the Ninth Circuit elects to reverse the dis-
trict court's decision in Kivalina and adopt American Electric's politi-
cal question reasoning.219
The influence of American Electric will be most directly deter-
mined by the Supreme Court's disposition of the case. 220 On De-
cember 6, 2010, the Court granted the American Electric defendants'
petition for certiorari. 221 The Court also announced Justice Sonia
Sotomayor has recused herself from the case. 2 2 2 justice Sotomayor
was a member of the Second Circuit panel when it heard oral argu-
ments in American Electric.223 As in Massachusetts, the vote of Justice
Kennedy will likely determine whether American Electric's political
question analysis survives the high court's review. 224 Given the
recusal of Justice Sotomayor, a four-to-four split, with Justice Ken-
nedy joining the court's three other more liberal justices, may be
the best outcome the plaintiffs and environmental community can
realistically hope for.2 2 5
Also, it must be remembered that the Second Circuit did not
actually rule on the merits of the plaintiffs' public nuisance claim in
218. Id. at 875-79 (following Second Circuit's reasoning in American Electric by
holding political question doctrine did not bar adjudication of plaintiffs' claim).
The Comer defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc in the Fifth Circuit
and rehearing was granted on February 26, 2010. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at
10849. On the date the Fifth Circuit was to hear the appeal, the court lacked a
quorum and determined that under its own precedent, it could not hear the Comer
appeal en banc. Id. at 10849-50. As a result, the court determined that its only
option was to dismiss the appeal altogether and permit the district court's dismissal
of the case to stand. Id. at 10850.
219. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10849 (discussing implications of Ninth
Circuit's forthcoming review of Kivalina on future of climate change litigation).
220. See id. at 10850 (observing that if Supreme Court refuses to grant peti-
tion for certiorari, "industry can anticipate an avalanche of climate change-related
federal nuisance actions").
221. Steven D. Cook, Climate Change: U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Utility Challenge
to Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Suit, BNA's Toxics LAw REPORTER: Toxic TORTs, Dec. 9,
2010, available at 2010 WL 4925992. (reporting that Court granted certiorari to
defendants in American Electric).
222. See id. (observing that Justice Sotomayor took no part in decision to
grant certiorari).
223. See id. (explaining Justice Sotomayor's role in American Electric prior to
her nomination to Supreme Court).
224. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10850 (asserting that Supreme Court will
likely be divided as in Massachussetts v. EPA, "with all eyes once again turned to
Justice Anthony Kennedy").
225. For a discussion ofJustice Sotomayor's recusal and the resulting expecta-
tion that the Court will be divided, with justice Kennedy playing the decisive role,
see supra notes 222 and accompanying text.
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American Electric.2 26 Therefore, in order for the plaintiffs to obtain
the relief they requested, they must still prove the defendants' GHG
emissions constitute an unreasonable interference with a right com-
mon to the general public.227 This feat will not be easily accom-
plished given the difficulty of proving causation in the context of a
global problem caused by manifold, diffuse emitters.228 There is
nevertheless reason to believe it may be possible for the American
Electric plaintiffs, and similarly situated future plaintiffs, to prevail
on the merits of their public nuisance claim.22 9
B. Possible Displacement of Federal Common Law by Recent
EPA Actions
In response to the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts
that the EPA essentially must regulate GHGs under the CAA, the
agency has recently issued two important rules. 230 These EPA ac-
tions may ultimately affect the outcome of American Electric on ap-
peal, as well as the status of future climate change lawsuits based on
federal nuisance law.23 1 The two new rules are the endangerment
finding under section 202 (a) of the CAA and the Tailoring Rule for
the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V per-
mit programs. 232
In the EPA's December 15, 2009 endangerment finding, a pre-
cursor to regulation under the mobile sources provisions of the
CAA, Administrator Lisa Jackson concluded that GHGs endanger
both public health and welfare by contributing to global warm-
ing.23 3 On May 7, 2010, the EPA published its first regulation of
226. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309, 332 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claim on political
question grounds).
227. See id. at 315-16 (summarizing court's holding).
228. See Christopher R. Reeves, Climate Change on Trial: Making the Case for
Causation, 32 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 495, 503-07 (2009) (discussing difficulty of prov-
ing causation for plaintiffs in climate change tort actions).
229. See generally id. at 508-23 (discussing various theories plaintiffs could po-
tentially use to prove causation in climate change actions).
230. For a discussion of recent EPA regulations and their potential impact on
climate change litigation, see infra notes 231 and accompanying text.
231. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10853 (noting that EPA recently issued two
important rules regarding regulation of GHGs under Clean Air Act).
232. See id. (stating names of two rules recently promulgated by EPA).
233. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66497 (Dec.
15, 2009) (summarizing EPA Administrator's finding that GHGs endanger public
health and welfare).
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mobile source GHG emissions.234 Due to the CAA's structure, once
the EPA issues and makes effective a regulation of GHG emissions
under any section of the Act, the requirements of the CAA's PSD
and Title V programs automatically become applicable to the GHG
emissions of stationary sources. 235 These programs are particularly
important to the issue of whether federal nuisance actions against
large GHGs emitters will be displaced because they require any sta-
tionary source emitting more than a certain threshold of a regu-
lated pollutant to obtain a permit.2 3 6 On May 13, 2010, the EPA
explained it would implement the PSD and Title V programs by
issuing a final "tailoring" rule.2 3 7 The rule states that, beginning on
January 2, 2011, the EPA will apply the CAA's stationary source per-
mitting requirements to the largest GHG emitters such as power
plants, cement production facilities, and refineries.238
Now that the Tailoring Rule has gone into effect, some courts
may find that its permitting requirements displace federal nuisance
litigation against large stationary sources of GHG emissions.239 Fur-
ther implementation, however, could be delayed or precluded de-
pending on the results of lawsuits filed by industry groups and
certain states challenging the legality of the EPA's recent GHG reg-
234. Light Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (increasing
CAFE standards and imposing GHG emissions limitations on passenger cars and
light-duty trucks); see also Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, EPA, 94 (Mar. 29, 2010)
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd memorecon_032910.pdf (noting that
vehicle emissions requirements will go into effect on January 2, 2011).
235. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10853 (explaining how regulation of new
pollutant under any provision of CAA triggers requirement that EPA begin to reg-
ulate stationary sources of pollutant under PSD and Title V programs).
236. See Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M. Bianco, What to Expect from EPA: Regula-
tion of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENvrL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIs 10480, 10481 (2010) (describing role of PSD and Title V permitting re-
quirements in regulation of large stationary sources under CAA).
237. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tai-
loring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (June 1, 2010).
238. See id. at 31516 (providing details regarding implementation schedule by
which PSD and Title V permit programs will be applied to stationary source GHG
emitters); see also EPA's Final Tailoring Rule: Its Future and Implications, COVINcTON &
BURLING LLP, 1 (May 20, 2010), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/56a039bc-
6ac7-40c5-b7a2-9f1 317d2b9b4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 743db5fe-73
1 d-46b3-8eef-ab907cfl 3dbO/EPA%2OFinal%2OTailoring%2ORule%20-%201ts%20
Future%20and%20Implications.pdf (explaining types of business entities that will
be subject to the PSD and Title V permitting programs under Tailoring Rule).
239. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10854 (noting that Tailoring Rule's appli-
cation of PSD and Title V permit programs to large stationary sources could pre-
empt future climate change litigation).
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ulations.240 Furthermore, even if the regulations are upheld, their
effect on climate change litigation will probably be modest because
courts are unlikely to interpret them as preempting nuisance ac-
tions brought under state law. 241 Nevertheless, when the Supreme
Court reviews American Electric, it may well find that the EPA's regu-
latory activity has sufficiently displaced the federal nuisance action
presented in this case.242
C. Impact of Decision on the United States' Regulation of
Carbon Emissions
Public nuisance litigation is hardly an optimal method for the
U.S. to regulate and reduce its GHG emissions.2 4 3 Comprehensive
legislation establishing a framework for regulating emissions would
achieve larger GHG reductions at a lower social cost than would a
series of multifarious court decisions. 244 Due to the politically po-
larizing debate surrounding climate change and the quasi-legisla-
tive relief sought by the plaintiffs in American Electric, the Second
Circuit's decision will be criticized by some as stepping beyond the
proper role of the Judiciary.245
Nevertheless, American Electric could provide a significant spur
to comprehensive federal legislation regulating GHGs, particularly
if more circuits choose to adopt the Second Circuit's political ques-
240. See id. (observing that Tailoring Rule and vehicle GHG emissions stan-
dards have been challenged on several fronts and may not go into effect for years);
see also Industrial Groups Target EPA Over Clean Air Act Rule, 30 No. 20 WEsTLAw J.
ENVrL. 1 (Apr. 29, 2010) (describing Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA law-
suit filed by agricultural and mining groups challenging EPA's Tailoring Rule).
The Tailoring Rule's greatest legal vulnerability is that the explicit statutory lan-
guage of the CAA sets clear PSD and Title V permitting thresholds at a level sub-
stantially lower than the 75,000 tons of emission-per-year level selected by the EPA
for regulating GHGs. See COVINcTON & BURLING LLP, supra note 238, at 3.
241. See Gaynor, supra note 212, at 10857 (observing that in past years, "even
in areas where the EPA has been deemed to occupy the field with CAA regulations,
states have [successfully] brought common-law nuisance challenges for the impacts
of interstate pollution").
242. For a discussion of the EPA's recent regulatory actions under the Clean
Air Act toward GHG emissions from mobile and stationary sources, see supra note
231 and accompanying text.
243. See May, supra note 163, at 952-53 (noting that few consider public nui-
sance-based climate change litigation to be more socially efficient means of regu-
lating GHG emissions than legislation).
244. See Hall, supra note 191, at 293-95 (suggesting regulating GHG emissions
through "piecemeal litigation against specific contributing entities" would be far
less efficient and desirable than comprehensive climate change legislation enacted
by Congress).
245. See Lexington: A Refreshing Dose of Honesty, supra note 163, at 69 (discussing
how climate change issue is politically divisive and partisan).
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tion analysis. 246 The threat of liability for carbon emissions through
adverse federal district court decisions could provide power and en-
ergy companies with a strong incentive to lobby Congress to enact a
more uniform and predictable statute regulating GHG emis-
sions.247 These industries have been instrumental in obstructing
the passage of climate change legislation through an intensive lob-
bying and public relations campaign. A change in their cost-benefit
analysis regarding carbon emissions regulation could substantially
improve the chances that such legislation will be enacted.248
Michael Schiraldi*
246. See Hall, supra note 191, at 294 (noting that Second Circuit's decision
may spur long-awaited action by the Executive and Legislative Branches regarding
regulation of GHG emissions).
247. See id. at 294-96 (discussing how threat of litigation may lead energy com-
panies and trade groups to lobby Congress for comprehensive legislation).
248. See id. (explaining how energy companies have played influential role in
obstructing passage of climate change legislation).
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Bates
College.
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEARING BOARD REVIEW
The Villanova Environmental Law Journal is proud to publish
the Environmental Hearing Board Review. The Review provides
Casenotes and Comments reflecting upon decisions of the Penn-
sylvania Environmental Hearing Board and areas of the law perti-
nent to practitioners before the Board. The Review seeks to
contribute to the practice of and to promote the scholarship of en-
vironmental law in Pennsylvania.
Consisting of five appointed judges, the Environmental Hear-
ing Board is a statutorily created agency with state-wide trial court
jurisdiction over certain environmental cases and appellate jurisdic-
tion over actions of the Department of Environmental Protection.
Appeals from the Board are taken to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.
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